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Chapter I  
 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, there were 4,385 farmers markets in the United States with annual sales 
totaling more than $1 billion. Farmers markets allow consumers to purchase locally 
grown produce which provides more money to local farmers because the money goes 
directly to the farmer and cuts out the middleman. Previous research has found that 
consumers that attend farmers markets have a higher price premium for purchasing 
locally grown produce than consumers that shop at traditional grocery stores. In a related 
but unexplored area of purchasing locally grown produce, economists have begun to test 
whether people always seek to maximize their own utility or if they care about others as 
well. A wealth of evidence has begun to accumulate in the growing field of behavioral 
and experimental economics that people care not only about their own monetary well-
being but also the well-being of others.  
This thesis will add to the behavioral and experimental economics literature 
through a framed field experiment that is designed to elicit shopper’s preferences for 
local and non-local farmers. A local farmer is defined as any farmer residing in the state 
of Oklahoma and a non-local farmer is any farmer outside of Oklahoma. The design, 
implementation, and results of this experiment will be presented in two parts. The first 
part focuses on whether shoppers at farmers markets exhibit higher levels of inequality 
aversion compared to shoppers at traditional grocery stores. This thesis reports on the 
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results from a framed field experiment administered to fifty-one respondents at a farmers 
market and a traditional grocery store in Edmond, OK. The experiment consisted of four 
tickets that shopper’s provided bids on to purchase each ticket for a distribution of money 
for themselves and a local or non-local farmer. Each ticket was designed to measure a 
consumer’s inequality aversion in a Fehr and Schmidt utility function, which is a specific 
utility functional form that shows individuals receiving disutility from having larger 
monetary payouts or smaller monetary payouts than someone else. Ticket 1 had a 
distribution of $4 to the respondent and $7 to a local farmer, and ticket 2 had the same 
distribution of money but a non-local farmer would receive $7. These tickets were 
designed to measure aversion to disadvantageous inequity in a Fehr and Schmidt utility 
function because the respondent would receive less than the denoted farmer. A 
respondent who would provide a high bid on tickets 1 & 2 would not mind the denoted 
farmer receiving more than them. So they would not be very averse to disadvantageous 
inequity. Ticket 3 had a distribution of $4 to the respondent and $1 to a local farmer and 
ticket 4 had the same distribution of money but a non-local farmer would receive $1. 
Tickets 3 & 4 were designed to measure a shopper’s aversion to advantageous inequity 
because they would be receiving a larger monetary payout than the farmer. Therefore, the 
higher the consumers bid, the more averse they are to advantageous inequity and would 
not like benefitting more than the farmer. For each ticket, the higher the respondent’s bid 
or willingness-to-pay for the ticket, the higher their concern for inequity (they do not like 
being better off than the denoted farmer). The results show that there is not a statistical 
difference in people that shop at farmers markets and grocery stores. However, people 
exhibit a higher concern for inequity towards local farmers than non-local farmers. 
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One of the biggest contributions of this thesis is that it used a field experiment 
instead of a traditional lab experiment. The second part of this thesis discusses the 
advantages and disadvantages of lab and field experiments. It also discusses my 
experience conducting a field experiment at a farmers market and a grocery store in 
Edmond, OK. 
  
 3
 
 
 
Chapter II  
 
 
CHAPTER II 
FAIRNESS, FARMERS MARKETS, AND LOCAL PRODUCTION 
The significant changes in agriculture in recent decades, including consolidation 
and vertical integration, the adoption of controversial technologies, and food safety scares 
have led some to question whether the benefits and costs of these developments have 
been equally distributed among all participants in the agricultural supply chain.  These 
concerns have sparked mainstream consumer interest in “alternative” products like 
organics, fair-trade, local and regional origin, farmer’s markets, no-GMO, no growth 
hormone, etc. that advertise improved sustainability and product quality.  Why are such 
products becoming more popular?  Unfortunately, existing market data are insufficient to 
conclusively identify and explain the growing appeal of such products.     
 A wealth of evidence has begun to accumulate in the growing field of behavioral 
and experimental economics that people care not only about their own monetary well-
being but also the well-being of others (e.g., see the review by Roth 1995).  Evidence 
from laboratory experiments further suggests that people care about inequality, 
efficiency, and distribution of outcomes (e.g., Engelmann and Strobel 2004).  The 
literature on the economics of charitable donations has found similar results, but have 
also noted  that other-regarding behavior is significantly influenced by framing of the 
task or decision (Eckel and Grossman 2008), being in the lab vs. the field (Levitt and List 
2007), and by individual-specific effects (Carpenter, Connolly, and Myers 2008).  The 
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underlying theme within this literature is that people have other-regarding preferences 
and that this behavior changes depending on the context and frame of the experiment.   
 Although there are a number of motivations that might cause people to seek out 
“alternative” food products, there is some evidence that other-regarding preferences play 
a significant role.  For example, Lusk and Briggeman (2008) found that willingness-to-
pay (WTP) for organic food was positively correlated with the extent to which people 
believe “fairness” (defined as the extent to which all parties involved in the production of 
food equally benefit) is important when purchasing food.  Darby et al. (2008) conducted a 
set of face-to-face interviews at farmers markets and grocery stores and found that Ohio 
consumers were willing to pay more for fresh strawberries that were grown in Ohio or 
were “locally grown.”  Others have found similar preferences by shoppers at farmers 
markets (Loureiro and Hine 2002 and Schneider and Francis 2005) and by shoppers at 
non-farmers markets (Zepeda and Leviten-Reid 2004) for purchasing locally produced 
food.  This line of recent literature suggests, even though it has not been directly 
addressed, that consumer preferences for “alternative” production systems might be 
influenced by people’s preferences for fairness and distribution of benefits in the food 
supply chain.  Supporters of farmers markets often also support equity-driven social 
movements, such as Food Justice, animal welfare, and Fair-Trade (Hinrichs 2000).  
 Our study elicits people’s other-regarding preferences through a framed field 
experiment in which people bid to buy tickets that provide monetary payouts to 
themselves and different types of farmers.  To formalize the notion of fairness, we build 
on the definition proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), who argued that people are 
averse to advantageous inequity (I have more money than you) and disadvantageous 
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inequity (you have more money than me).  We measure these two types of inequality 
aversion in a framed field experiment in two distinct locations – a farmers market and a 
traditional grocery store, both located in Edmond, Oklahoma.  In each location, we 
measure consumers’ concern for inequity between themselves and a local farmer (any 
farmer in the state of Oklahoma) and themselves and a non-local farmer (any farmer 
outside of Oklahoma).   
The results provide insight into whether concern for inequity is a factor that 
partially explains why people shop at farmers markets and why there exists a willingness-
to-pay premium for local food products. Shoppers at farmers markets may exhibit higher 
levels of inequality aversion than at traditional grocery stores because (i) different types 
of people tend to shop at farmers markets than at grocery stores and/or (ii) people change 
their preferences depending on the shopping location.  Additionally, shoppers may 
perceive local farmers as struggling, marginalized, and deserving of special attention.  
Our experimental results, coupled with information obtained in a follow-up survey, 
provide insight into these issues. 
Conceptual Framework 
Traditional economic models assume that people act in a manner to maximize their own 
self-interest and are not concerned with others.  As previously indicated, there is some 
evidence to suggest otherwise.  Fehr and Schmidt (1999) developed a theoretical model 
to capture an individual’s concern for inequity.  To simplify Fehr and Schmidt’s 
theoretical exposition, assume a decision-maker (i) maximizes their utility of receiving a 
moneta  y
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ry pa out (xi) and a payout to another individual (xj), 
(1)  ௜ܷ൫ݔ௜, ݔ௝൯ ൌ ݔ௜ െ ߙ௜maxൣݔ௝ െ ݔ௜, 0൧ െ ߚ௜maxൣݔ௜ െ ݔ௝, 0൧, 
where, αi represents the decision-maker’s disutility from disadvantageous inequity and βi 
represents the decision-maker’s disutility from advantageous inequity.   
The underlying idea behind equation (1) is that utility is discounted as the 
difference between xi and xj increases.  Aversion to disadvantageous inequity (i.e., when 
xj > xi) is reflected in the αi parameter.  A larger αi reflects greater aversion to 
disadvantageous inequity.  If xi > xj, then utility decreases because the decision-maker is 
in an advantageous payout position thus βi reflects the aversion to advantageous 
inequality. 
In our study, we build on Fehr and Schmidt and other studies that have calibrated 
or elicited the αi or βi inequity parameters (e.g., Dannenberg, Sturm, and Vogt 2007).  
This is accomplished through a simple and straightforward willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
experiment that still allows one to discuss concerns for inequity and is easy to implement 
in the field.  To focus attention on WTP, equation (1) is slightly modified by introducing 
the parameter λ, which is i’s WTP a portion of their allocation xi such that j will receive 
xj.  More formally, 
(2) ௜ܷ ቀሺݔ௜ െ λ௜ሻ, ݔ௝ቁ ൌ ሺݔ௜ െ λ௜ሻ െ ߙ௜maxൣݔ௝ െ ሺݔ௜ െ λ௜ሻ, 0൧ െ ߚ௜maxൣሺݔ௜ െ λ௜ሻ െ ݔ௝, 0൧ 
 To illustrate how concerns for inequity impact a decision-maker’s λi, consider 
these simple thought exercises.  A decision-maker that is highly averse to 
disadvantageous inequity will have a larger αi, so when xj > xi, they would not be willing 
to forgo a portion of xi because that would only exacerbate the “unfairness” between 
themselves and the other individual. Therefore, λi would either be very small or zero.  
Inversely, the decision-maker may have a small αi, which would lead to a higher λ i 
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because an individual with a small αi is not as affected or concerned with having less 
money than someone else. 
 Take another decision-maker that is highly averse to advantageous inequity or has 
a high βi.  This decision-maker would be willing to pay more of their own payout to 
minimize the inequity (xi – λi – xj).  What is interesting about this situation is that an 
individual may be willing to pay enough to make their net effective payout (xi – λi) less 
than the payout to someone else (xj).  In other words, a decision maker could be so averse 
to advantageous inequity that they effectively put themselves in a disadvantageous 
inequity position.  Although this seems like an odd situation, it is one we observed in our 
empirical study.   
 Now, consider the most someone would be willing to pay to obtain a “ticket” 
where they receive xi and another person receives xj.  If the ticket is not purchased xi= 
xj=0, and Ui=0. Thus, we can set equation (2) equal to zero and solve for λi.  If xj > xi, 
then ߣ௜ ൌ
ఈ೔൫௫೔ି௫ೕ൯ା௫೔
ଵାఈ೔
.  The derivative of λi w.r.t αi is െ
௫ೕ
ሺଵାఈ೔ሻమ
, and is strictly negative 
over positive ݔ௝ payouts (except if αi = -1 because the derivative is undefined).  This 
means WTP is directly related to the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) preference parameter, with 
a higher WTP corresponding to a greater concern for others as discussed above.  If xi > xj, 
then ߣ௜ ൌ
௫೔ିఉ೔൫௫೔ି௫ೕ൯
ଵିఉ೔
.  The derivative of λi w.r.t βi is 
௫ೕ
ሺఉ೔ିଵሻమ
 and is strictly positive over 
positive ݔ௝ payouts (except if βi = 1 in which case the derivative is undefined).  Once 
again, this means a higher WTP corresponds to a greater higher concern for others. 
Placing the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model in a WTP framework eases the 
implementation of our field experiment while maintaining the intuition and integrity of 
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their model of disadvantageous and advantageous inequality aversion.  That is, given an 
estimated value for WTP or λi, one could easily use the equations above to calculate the 
implied αi or βi. 
Experimental Method and Empirical Model 
To measure preferences for inequality aversion, we presented each subject with 4 tickets 
(or purchase options) that had various payouts to the respondent, and either a randomly 
selected local farmer or a randomly selected non-local farmer.  Here is the payout 
structure of each ticket: ticket 1, $4 to the subject and $7 to a local farmer; ticket 2, $4 to 
the subject and $7 to a non-local farmer; ticket 3, $4 to the subject and $1 to a local 
farmer; ticket 4, $4 to the subject and $1 to a non-local farmer.  Therefore, tickets 1 and 2 
represented disadvantageous payouts and tickets 3 and 4 represented advantageous 
payouts.  Likewise, tickets 1 and 3 involve payouts to local farmers, whereas tickets 2 
and 4 involve payouts to non-local farmers.   
People placed bids to buy each ticket, which correspond to the theoretical 
parameter λi, derived in the previous section.  Note that our method purposefully avoids 
the use of the word “give” in an attempt to avoid invoking a social norm to give.  As will 
be explained momentarily, we also followed a standard experimental format to ensure a 
respondent will answer in a truthful manner (i.e., answers were anonymous and 
confidential, experiment was non-hypothetical and incentive compatible, etc.).  An 
appendix is available that has the written text for the experiment and (Toler et al. 2008).   
 Although people placed bids to buy four tickets, only one ticket was randomly 
selected as the binding.  For the binding ticket, a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) 
(BDM) mechanism was used to determine if the ticket was purchased.  In particular, a 
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random ‘secret price’ was drawn between the values of $0 and $5.  If the subject’s bid 
was less than the ‘secret price,’ then the subject did not win the auction (they paid 
nothing, they received nothing, and the farmer received nothing).  If the bid exceeded the 
‘secret price,’ the subject paid the ‘secret price’, received the residual payout, and 
watched as the survey administrator placed the payout to either the local or non-local 
farmer in a pre-stamped, pre-addressed envelope.  The envelopes were shown and were 
clearly visible to each individual prior to the biding.  This BDM mechanism is incentive 
compatible, meaning people have a dominant strategy to truthfully state their maximum 
WTP for each ticket.  The experiment instructions explicitly explained why it was in each 
person’s interest to state the most they were WTP for each ticket.  After the auction, each 
respondent completed a short follow-up survey asking questions about demographics, 
prior attendance at farmers markets, reasons for shopping there, etc. 
Each subject provided four bids (i.e., four λi values) corresponding to each of the 
four tickets.  Each ticket was designed to measure a specific form of inequity aversion 
relative to a local or non-local farmer.  A regression can be estimated to identify how 
inequity aversion varies across local and non-local farmers and how inequality aversion 
differs at farmers market and traditional grocery stores.  To implement the model, 
dummy variables were created corresponding to the four tickets (t=1, 2, 3, or 4) related to 
disadvantageous inequity (DISADVi,t=1 and t=2), local farmers (LOCALi,t=1 and t=3), and 
disadvantageous inequity with a local farmer (DISADV*LOCALi,t=1).  The empirical 
mo l ide s, 
(3) ߣ௜,௧ ൌ ߤ଴௜ ൅ ߤଵܦܫܵܣܦ ௧ܸୀଵ ୟ୬ୢ ௧ୀଶ ൅ ߤଶܮܱܥܣܮ௧ୀଵ ୟ୬ୢ ௧ୀଷ ൅ ߤଷܦܫܵܣܦܸ כ
        ܮܱܥܣܮݐൌ1൅ߝݐ   
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where ߤ଴௜ is the intercept and given the construction of the dummy variables, is directly 
interpreted as the WTP for ticket 4, and represents the situation when the participant was 
in an advantageous position relative to a non-local farmer.  The remaining μ’s are 
coefficients corresponding to the aforementioned dummy variables and ߝ௜,௧ is the error 
term.  Given that each person submitted four bids, there are repeated measures for each 
subject, and as such, equation (3) was estimated using a random effects specification 
allowing for within-subject correlation of the error term. 
To determine if WTP varied across the grocery store and farmers market settings, 
equation (3) was estimated for both samples (the unrestricted models), for the pooled data 
(the restricted model), and a likelihood ratio test was conducted.  Data was collected at 
the Edmond Farmers Market and at a traditional grocery store, Crest Foods, in Edmond, 
Oklahoma.  Data was collected in both locations during June and July, 2008.  People 
were randomly intercepted as they entered the farmers market or grocery store and were 
asked to participate in the study.  In each location, 51 subjects participated, for a total 
sample size of 102 subjects.   
Results 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the participants.  Most individuals in our data 
have shopped at a farmers market.  The frequency of shopping at a farmers market is not 
surprisingly greater for those subjects in the farmers market treatment (51 percent go 3 or 
more times a month) as opposed to the traditional grocery store treatment (73 percent go 
1-2 times a month).  For those subjects that had shopped at a farmers market, most stated 
their primary reason for shopping there was because of higher quality food (50 percent).  
Supporting the local community was the next most stated reason (33 percent) and the 
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least stated reasons for shopping at a farmers market were promoting a more equitable 
food production and distribution system (8 percent), entertainment or experience (5 
percent), and lower food prices (5 percent).  These reasons are consistent across both 
treatments.  The majority of the sample was female, the average age was 47 and the 
average total household income was $67,500, which is similar to the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s 2006 median total household income estimate for Edmond, Oklahoma, $62,635. 
Table II-1. Descriptive Statistics of the Experimental Data 
Variable Pooled Farmers Market Grocery Store 
Have you ever shopped at farmers markets?  
(yes = 1; 0 otherwise) 0.86 1 0.73 
If you have shopped at a farmers market, then how often: 
1-2 times a month 0.59 0.49 0.73 
3-4 times a month 0.31 0.37 0.22 
5 or more times a month 0.10 0.14 0.05 
If you have shopped at a farmers market, then why: 
To support the local community 0.33 0.33 0.32 
Lower food prices 0.05 0.02 0.08 
Higher food quality 0.50 0.47 0.54 
To promote a more equitable food production distribution system 0.08 0.12 0.03 
Entertainment or experience 0.05 0.06 0.03 
Some other reason 0 0 0 
Gender (Male = 1; Female = 0) 0.33 0.35 0.31 
Age 47.44  48.31  46.57  
(14.04) (13.56) (14.48) 
Total Household Incomea $67,499.67  $65,293.80  $69,705.53  
($26,019.81) ($27,045.22) ($24,822.82) 
Number of Observations 102 51 51 
13
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
a Respondents checked one of the following ranges: under $20,000; $20,000 to $34,999; $35,000 to $49,999; $50,000 to $64,999; $65,000 to $79,999; $80,000 to 
$94,999; and over $95,000. Continuous income is calculated by using the range midpoint and $20,000 for the under range and $95,000 for the over range. 
 
Table 2 reports the mean WTP for each ticket at the farmers markets and grocery 
store.  The highest average WTP for any ticket at both locations was ticket 1, which paid 
$4 to the subject and $7 to a local farmer.  However, the average WTP for ticket 1 was 
slightly higher at the farmers market ($3.80) than the grocery store ($3.35).  Changing 
from a local to non-local farmer (i.e. moving from ticket 1 to ticket 2), decreases average 
WTP by about $1 in the farmers market and grocery store.  Tickets 3 and 4 put the 
subject in an advantageous monetary position.  Although the WTP for tickets 3 and 4 are 
less than their disadvantageous counterparts, subjects were still willing to pay more for 
the local than the non-local farmer ticket.  What is interesting is that subjects, on average, 
were willing to pay almost $3 for ticket 3.  Paying more than $3 for ticket 3 would 
change the subject’s net monetary payout from an advantageous monetary position to a 
disadvantageous monetary position.  In the sample, 54 percent of the subjects stated they 
would be willing to pay more than $3 for ticket 3.  Thus, these subjects have a large 
inequity concern for the local farmer. To test if WTP for each ticket differs across 
Table II-2. Average Willingness-to-Pay for the Tickets at the Farmers Market 
and Grocery Store 
Ticket Farmers Market Grocery Store 
Ticket 1: $4 to You and $7 to a Local Farmer $3.80 $3.35 
($1.14) ($1.28) 
Ticket 2: $4 to You and $7 to a Non-local Farmer $2.56  $2.60  
($1.37) ($1.37) 
Ticket 3: $4 to You and $1 to a Local Farmer $2.76  $2.81  
($1.34) ($1.38) 
Ticket 4: $4 to You and $1 to a Non-local Farmer $2.04  $2.15  
($1.24) ($1.22) 
Number of Observations 51 51 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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location, we conducted a Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test. The WTP for tickets 2-4 do not 
statistically differ across location but ticket 1’s WTP is statistically different at the 10 
percent level.  
A likelihood ratio test is conducted to see if WTP differed across the two 
locations (farmers market and traditional grocery store).  The log likelihood value for the 
restricted model and the unrestricted model, respectively are -626.38 and -625.44, which 
produces a chi-square test statistic of 1.88.  Given that there are 4 degrees of freedom, the 
p-value is 0.75.  Thus, we fail to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients in equation (3) 
differ across the farmers’ market and grocery store.  That is, the appropriate model 
specification is the restricted model where the data is pooled across location.  These 
results imply that people shopping at farmers markets were no more or less concerned 
about inequity or local farmers than were people shopping at a traditional grocery store.  
Apparently in this experiment, field context did not matter. 
 Although we found no difference across location, one might contend that 
preferences for inequality differ across individuals based on their familiarity with farmers 
markets, number of times they shop at farmers markets, why they shop at farmers 
markets, and other socio-economic and demographic information.  However, likelihood 
ratio tests fail to reject the hypothesis that the parameters in equation (3) vary by any of 
these variables.  
 Table 3 presents the regression results from equation (3) fit to the pooled data.  
Recall that the intercept corresponds to WTP for ticket 4, which is the least desirable 
ticket.  Still, this WTP is positive ($2.10) and statistically significant thus our sample 
exhibited an aversion to advantageous inequity.  Subjects were willing to pay $0.48 more 
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for the disadvantageous tickets than the advantageous tickets.  In other words, 
preferences for fairness in allocating money between the subject and both types of 
farmers are quite high.  However, subjects were WTP $0.69 more for a ticket that 
identified local farmers as the recipient instead of a non-local farmer recipient, and this 
amount further increased when the local farmer would receive $7 (by an additional 
$0.30).  These results imply that our sample of participants demonstrated a high level of 
other-regarding behavior toward local farmers; especially when the local farmer would 
receive a larger payout than they would receive. 
Table II-3. Pooled Regression Results of the Effect of Inequality and Farm Type 
on Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) for Tickets 
Variable Estimates 
Intercepta 2.10*** 
(0.13) 
WTP for a Disadvantageous over Advantageous Inequity Positionb 0.48*** 
(0.13) 
WTP for a Local over Non-local Farmer Recipientc 0.69*** 
(0.13) 
WTP for Disadvantageous Inequity * Local Farmer Recipientd 0.30* 
(0.18) 
 
Number of Observationse 408 
Log Likelihood -626.38*** 
Notes: Statistical significance at the 1 and 10 percent level are denoted *** and *, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
a Coefficient corresponds to WTP for ticket 4, in which the participant receives $4 and non-local farmer 
receives $1. 
b Coefficient corresponds to change in WTP as one moves from tickets 1 and 2 (participant receives $4 and 
local and non-local farmer receive $7, respectively) to tickets 3 and 4 (participant receives $4 and local and 
non-local farmer receive $1, respectively).  
c Coefficient corresponds to change in WTP as one moves from tickets 1 and 3 (participant receives $4 and 
local farmer receives $7 and $1, respectively) to tickets 2 and 4 (participant receives $4 and local farmer 
receives $7 and $1, respectively). 
d Coefficient corresponds to the WTP for ticket 1 (participant receives $4 and local farmer receives $7). 
e A total of 102 individuals provided four WTP values for a total of 408 observations. 
 
 16
Conclusions and Implications for Oklahoma Farmers Markets and Retailers 
In this study, we examined preferences toward money allocations to local and non-local 
farmers among consumers who shop at a farmers market and a traditional grocery store.  
Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999), fairness was conceptualized as advantageous and 
disadvantageous inequality aversion, which was measured by determining people’s WTP 
for monetary allocations to themselves and to a randomly selected local or non-local 
farmer.  
 The results of this study are consistent with similar studies that found individuals 
exhibit other-regarding behavior.  Our study is unique in that we ventured into the field to 
elicit inequity concerns, and did so using a simple willingness-to-pay experiment.  We 
also contribute to the literature by investigating whether field setting (farmers markets vs. 
grocery store) influences other-regarding preferences toward local and/or non-local 
farmers.  
 We found that people preferred money allocations going to local farmers over 
identical allocations to non-local farmers.  Previous research has shown consumers are 
willing to pay a price premium for “locally grown” products and our results would 
support these findings.  Somewhat surprisingly, we could not reject the hypothesis that 
such preferences were the same for shoppers at a farmers market and a traditional grocery 
store.  One potential reason for this result is a large percentage of our data had shopped at 
a farmers market so they would exhibit other-regarding preferences for local farmers 
whether they were approached at a grocery store or at a farmers market.  Another reason 
is that the word “local” may create a connection or a common bond between consumer 
and producer since both live in Oklahoma.   
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 Regardless of why we did not find a difference between farmers market and 
grocery store shoppers, our sample did exhibit inequity concerns for local farmers and a 
willingness-to-pay to alleviate these concerns.  Consumers in our sample exhibited a 
preference for fairness in the distribution of benefits in the food supply chain, especially 
when those benefits accrued to a local farmer.  These results and previous findings of 
consumers’ preference for locally produced foods at farmers markets (Darby et al. 2008) 
and non-farmers markets (Zepeda and Leviten-Reid 2004), indicates there may be a large, 
untapped potential for supporting local farms through both farmers markets and 
conventional marketing channels at a traditional grocery store. 
 This research has major implications for farmers markets and retailers. One of the 
biggest findings of this research is that consumers in Oklahoma prefer local farmers 
verses non-local farmers. Therefore, farmers markets as well as grocery stores need to 
emphasize locally grown products. This can be more simply done at the farmers market 
since the farmer is there and can directly advertise that he/she grew the product. In order 
for a grocery store to capture this premium for locally grown food, they need to advertise 
that the product is locally grown. Retailers on the West Coast have been successful at this 
because they have devoted an entire section at the grocery store for local products. In 
order for retailers in Oklahoma to be successful they must have a separate section for 
local products in order for consumers to differentiate where the product is from. By 
promoting local products, the retailers will be able to capture more business and help 
support the local economy. 
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Chapter III  
 
 
CHAPTER III 
EXPOSITION OF LAB VS. FIELD EXPERIMENTS: 
One of the major contributions of this study was the use of a field experiment as 
opposed to a lab experiment. Historically, experimenters have not looked at field 
behavior in a serious manner and have just used a traditional lab setting to elicit 
responses. Harrison and List 2004 state that there are six factors to determine the field 
context of an experiment; the nature of the subject pool, the nature of the information that 
the subjects bring to the task, the nature of the commodity, the nature of the task or 
trading rules applied, the nature of the stakes, and the nature of the environment that the 
subject operates in. We will take a look at what these six factors are and how we applied 
them to this study. 
The nature of the subject pool defines participants as “standard” and “non-
standard.” A “standard” participant is one that the experimenter has easy access to using. 
An example of a “standard” participant would be a professor bringing surveys to a 
classroom and using his/her students as respondents. A “non-standard” participant is one 
that the experimenter has never been in contact with before and is sought in the 
environment in which the research examines. Therefore, the people taking the experiment 
do not know the person conducting the experiment and also are a true representation of 
the field being studied. In our experiment, people shopping at the farmers market and at 
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the grocery store were “non-standard” participants. This is because they were sought in 
the environment, farmers market or grocery store, which this research examined. 
The nature of the information the subjects bring to the task is a very important 
attribute of a field experiment. Subjects used in a lab experiment can have very little 
knowledge of the area being studied. Also, they may only be there for monetary 
incentives or because their professor is making them take it. Field experiments use 
subjects that are participating in the field of study being examined. For example, to 
examine if concern for inequity towards a local farmer was a reason why people shopped 
at farmers markets we conducted our survey at a farmers market and at a grocery store. 
Subjects in a lab setting may have never shopped at a farmers market and would not 
represent the population that does shop at a farmer’s market. Nature of the environment is 
similar to nature of the information the subjects bring to the task in that people have more 
vested interest if they are in the field of study. 
Due to the nature of the commodity, abstract goods and services are artificial and 
can influence behavior. For example, if you were asked by someone how much you 
would be willing-to-pay for a pair of Nike shoes but did not have to actually pay for 
them, your stated WTP may be much higher than your actual WTP. For our experiment 
we had consumers state their WTP for an allocation of money that they would actually 
receive and that a local or non-local farmer would actually receive. We used an actual 
payout that they would receive and a farmer would receive to elicit their true WTP.  
“The nature of the task that the subject is being asked to undertake is an important 
component to a field experiment, since one would expect that field experience could play 
a major role in helping individuals develop heuristics for special tasks” Harrison and List 
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2004. People come into an experiment with different pre-conceived notions about what 
the experiment is trying to ask and answer it in a manner that they think the experimenter 
wants them to answer. It is important that the experiment does not form a bias toward 
what it is trying to examine and it should be very easy for the subject to follow. In our 
experiment the subjects knew that we were examining WTP for different farm types at a 
farmers market as well as a grocery store. The payouts were the same for each farm type 
and it was unclear as to what exactly we were studying.  
The nature of the stakes means that respondents will act differently given the 
different incentives they have for taking a survey. A respondent may participate in a lab 
experiment for many reasons. One of the biggest reasons that people participate in lab 
experiments is due to monetary incentives. If a subject participates in a lab experiment 
for monetary incentives then they do not have a vested interest other than making money 
and may not truly represent the population. If a subject is paid a significant amount of 
money, say $100, they will participate differently than somebody that is only paid $1. If 
our study was done in a laboratory we would have had to pay consumers to come take 
our survey. This could affect their WTP for each ticket on our survey because they may 
feel that since they already have money they will state a higher WTP to help the farmer.  
One of the reasons that experimenters have traditionally used lab settings is 
because they would simply ask themselves if they felt like the students would generate 
the same responses as people in the field. They would usually state they felt they did and 
move on with their study. Harrison and List 2004 state that, “it is easy to say the 
experiment would be the same for real people but it is much harder to do so because of 
some serious and often unattractive logistical problems.”  
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One of the biggest concerns with lab experiments is that they are usually given at 
a time most convenient for the experimenter to students. These students are selected some 
way, i.e. signed up on a web-site to take surveys for money, which may leave out “certain 
individuals with characteristics that are important determinants of underlying population 
behavior (Harrison and List, 2004).” Rustrom 1998 also found that paying people to 
come take a lab experiment will form biases in respondent’s answers. 
In our field experiment, we found that who you test your pilot study on can also 
play a major factor in the success of your experiment. We initially developed an 
experiment based on a survey given by Danenburg and Sturm. Their study was given to 
respondents that had knowledge in their field of study and were also given a significant 
monetary incentive, $100. We tested our pilot study with secretaries from within the Ag-
Economics department at Oklahoma State University. After they took the experiment, 
they stated that the survey was easy to follow and that they did not think that it was too 
long. We did not do any further testing and prepared to administer it in the field. When 
we administered our experiment at the grocery store we observed that the respondents 
were having difficulty understanding the questions being asked and also that it was taking 
them too long. After three hours we only had seven respondents participate in our 
experiment and we could only use one of them. 
After our first day of administering our initial experiment we knew that we 
needed to re-think our strategy. The next week we revised our survey by applying WTP 
to the Fehr and Schmidt utility function which made it much easier for the respondent to 
understand which in turn cut the survey time in half. We ran another pilot test on our new 
survey but this time with people outside of the department that did not know what we 
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were studying. They were able to follow the experiment by reading instructions and it 
took them less than five minutes. 
After we concluded our pilot study, we proceeded by administering our 
experiment at the grocery store. We continued to have a low response rate, but all of the 
responses we were getting were capable of being used. When we administered our 
experiment at the farmers market we had a much higher response rate, 51 in six hours. 
We attribute the higher response rate at the farmers market due to the fact that many 
people attend the farmers market for an “experience” and are not in a rush. People that 
are shopping at grocery stores usually have a list of items that they need and are there to 
get-in and get-out. From this we can expand on the importance of field vs. lab 
experiments. When conducting a field experiment, you need to understand the people 
who are going to be participating in your experiment. For example, when we 
administered our initial experiment at the grocery store we were getting responses that 
were not useful because the subjects were in a hurry and did not want to take the time to 
take a long survey.   
 When conducting an experiment, you need to consider if your question can be 
answered in a lab or field setting. Thus, you need to determine the implications of both 
and determine which setting is most appropriate. Once you determine which setting to 
conduct your experiment, you need to make sure that you are prepared. Make sure that 
you have an understanding of what type of people you are going to encounter. This will 
enable you to have a higher rate of success on your experiment.  
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Appendix: Experimental Procedures 
Determining Sample Size 
To determine the number of subjects for our experiment at the farmers market and at the 
grocery store, we conducted a pilot study based on the model used by Dannenberg, 
Sturm, and Vogt.  Respondents from our pilot study were students and staff at Oklahoma 
State University.  Results of our study had an average value of αi equal to 0.1633 and a 
standard deviation, σα equal to 0.378. To estimate our sample size (S) we used the 
following equation, 
(1)  
( )
2
221 )1(2
Δ
−Φ+=
−
ασβAZS , 
where ZA represents the z-statistic testing the likelihood of rejecting the null hypothesis 
that the difference in parameters across treatment is zero, which we set to 1.96, which 
corresponds to the 95% confidence interval.  We set the power of this test or the 
probability of rejecting the null equal to (1 – β), where β equals 0.2 and the sample 
average is assumed to come from a normal distribution.  Note that Φ is the normal 
cumulative distribution function.  Finally, the margin of error, Δ, is the critical effect size 
(or minimum detectible difference) that represents the minimum difference in αi between 
the two treatments that can be identified between the farmers market and traditional 
grocery store (Δ = 0.162).  Entering these numbers into equation (1) yielded a sample size 
of 51 respondents that would need to be surveyed in the two locations. 
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Experimental Instructions and Follow-up Survey 
 
 
 
 
 Division of Agricultural Sciences and Natural Resources 
 
 
 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
308 Agricultural Hall 
Stillwater, Oklahoma 74078-6026 
Fax: 405-744-8210 
405-744-6157 or 405-744-6156 
 
 
 
With funding from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), we are investigating consumer 
preferences for local and non-local foods. A local farmer lives in the state of Oklahoma and non-local 
farmer lives outside of Oklahoma. On the next page, we would like you to: (1) participate in an ‘auction’ 
to purchase a set of payouts to yourself, a local farmer and a non-local farmer; and (2) answer several 
demographic and opinion based questions about yourself. 
 
Your response to this survey is voluntary, it will be kept anonymous and should take 5 minutes to 
complete. There are no known risks associated with this survey which are greater than those ordinarily 
encountered in daily life. If you have questions about your rights as a research volunteer, you may contact 
Dr. Shelia Kennison, IRB Chair, 219 Cordell North, Stillwater, OK 74078, 405-744-1676 or 
irb@okstate.edu. 
 
Thank you for your time and if you have any question, please contact us. 
 
Steve Toler      Brian C. Briggeman 
Graduate Student      Assistant Professor 
Department of Agricultural Economics  Department of Agricultural Economics 
Oklahoma State University    Oklahoma State University 
steve.toler@okstate.edu    brian.briggeman@okstate.edu  
(405) 744-6161     (405) 744-6171 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A3    
 27
 
 
 
Below are four tickets. Please write down the most you are willing to pay to receive the dollar amount 
paid to you and a random local or non-local farmer on each ticket. After you write these amounts, an 
‘auction’ will proceed as follows. 
 
1. We will randomly select one of the tickets as the binding ticket to auction. 
 
2. For the randomly selected ticket we will determine a ‘secret price’ by randomly drawing a number 
between $0 and $5.00. 
a. If your stated willingness to pay is less than the randomly drawn ‘secret price,’ then you 
will not purchase the ticket. You will receive no money and a local or non-local farmer 
will receive no money.   
b. If your stated willingness to pay is greater than the ‘secret price,’ then you will purchase 
the ticket for an amount equal to the ‘secret price.’ Note: the net dollar amount you will 
actually receive is the difference between the dollar shown on the ticket payable to you and 
the ‘secret price.’ For example, if ticket 1 is randomly selected as binding, the randomly 
determined ‘secret price’ is $1, and your stated willingness to pay is higher than $1, then 
you will receive $4 - $1 = $3 and a local farmer will receive $7. 
 
NOTE: You will never end up paying a price higher than the dollar amount you write on each ticket. 
Therefore, your best strategy is to state the most you are willing to pay for each ticket, which provides 
actual payouts to you and a randomly selected local or non-local farmer. 
 
 
 Ticket 1   Ticket 2 
 
 You will receive $4  You will receive $4 
 Local farmer will receive $7  Non-local farmer will receive $7 
 
 The most I am   The most I am 
 willing to pay for this ticket is $__________  willing to pay for this ticket is $__________ 
 
 
 
 
 Ticket 3  Ticket 4 
 
 You will receive $4  You will receive $4 
 Local farmer will receive $1  Non-local farmer will receive $1 
 
 The most I am   The most I am 
 willing to pay for this ticket is $__________  willing to pay for this ticket is $__________ 
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Demographic questions 
 
1. Have you ever shopped at a farmers market? If yes answer 2 & 3. Otherwise proceed to question #4. 
 Yes                                           
 No 
 
2. On average, how often do you shop at farmers markets during the months of April through August? 
 Never                                         3–4 times a month 
 1–2 times a month                     5 or more times a month 
 
3. Which of the following best describes why you shop at farmers markets? Please check only one, if you 
check ‘Other’ please indicate why. 
 To support the local community 
 Lower food prices 
 Higher food quality 
 To promote a more equitable food production distribution system 
 Entertainment or experience 
 Other   _______________________________________________________________ 
 
4. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? Answer each statement using the following 
scale: 
 
a. On average, local farmers make higher profits when I buy from farmers markets rather than traditional 
grocery stores. 
 
b. On average, non-local farmers make higher profits when I buy from farmers markets rather than 
traditional grocery stores. 
 
c. On average, local farmers make less profit than non-local farmers. 
 
 
5. What is your current age in years?________ 
 
6. What is your gender?    Male   Female 
 
7. What was your total household income (before taxes) for 2007? 
 Under $20,000                         $20,000-$34,999 
 $35,000-$49,999                      $50,000-$64,999 
 $65,000-$79,999                      $80,000-$94,999 
 Over $95,000 
 
8. What is your level of education? 
 No high school diploma                     High school graduate  
  AA/Technical Degree                       Bachelor’s degree 
 Master’s degree or higher 
 
9. Are there any children in your household under the age of 12? 
 Yes 
 No 
Strongly Stongly
Disagree Disagree Indifferent Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
A5
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